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ABSTRACT
The paper examines a simple model in which exogenous
political risk creates uncertainty about tariffs. The model
predicts a relation between consumption and tariffs that
differs radically from that implied by models without asset
markets or political risk. Given the probability distribution
of tariffs, domestic consumption and utility (ex post) are
lower in states of the world with a domestic tariff and no
foreign tariff than with a foreign tariff and no domestic tariff.
This conclusion emerges despite the fact that the opposite
would be obtained in the absence of asset markets. So economists
should not be surprised if observed relations between consumption
and tariffs differ from the predictions of static theory in
either time—series or cross—sections.
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The theory of protection has been developed in nonstochastic models
without international asset trade. Extensions of the theory of international
trade to encompass uncertainty have focused primarily on stochastic
technologies or stochastic prices faced by a small economy. Helpman and Razin
(1978) and Pomery (1984) survey and develop some of these models. However,
little work has been done on the effects of uncertainty that results from the
political process, even though that process is often thought to be an
important source of uncertainty. Political risk has been cited, for example,
as a reason for segmentation of international capital markets (see the survey
by Adler and Dumas, 1983) and as an important factor affecting international
direct investment.
This paper examines a simple model in which exogenous political risk
creates uncertainty about tariffs. We focus on the effects of this risk on
optimal portfolio allocation, and the implications of asset market trade for
resource allocation and ex post consumption and utility. We show that in a
world with political risk, a tariff that increases consumption when no assets
can be traded decreases ex post consumption and utility in the presence of
complete asset markets.We present a model of a two-country world with
exogenous, random tariffs.Households trade in asset markets, and choose
optimal protfolios that depend on the stochastic properties of these random
government policies.We show that, given the probability distribution of2
tariffs,domestic consumption and utility are lower in states of the world
with a domestic tariff than in states with a foreign tariff.In fact,
domestic consumption in states with a foreign tariff is higher than that with
no tariffs. Our model, therefore, predicts a relationship between consumption
and tariffs that differs radically from the relations implied by models that
ignore asset markets.
II. Asimple Random Tariffs Model
Considera world of 2 countries, 2 goods that are endowments to the
countries, and 4 states of the world.In state of the world 0, there are no
tariffs. In state of the world 1, the domestic country imposes a tariff at
rate t.In state 2, the foreign (but not the domestic) country imposes a
tariff at the same rate t.In state of the world 3, both countries impose
tariffs at rate 't.Assume that all tariff revenues are refunded to consumers
in the country imposing the tariff, in a lump-sum manner. Assume that states
1 and 2 have equal probabilities, and denote the probability of any state by
Call the two goods X and Y. Let X and Y denote endowments of X and Y in
the home country.Let and Y denote foreign endowments, and assume that
X =Yand Y X, and that is sufficiently large relative to Vthatthe
home country will always be an exporter of X and an importer of Y, in the
cases discussed here. We interpret the random tariffs as resulting from
uncertainty in the political process.
Assume that there is a representative consumer in each country and that
tastes are identical across countries. Trade occurs because of different
endowments. Moreover, assume that the function U(x,y)U(y,x), for all x,y,
and that U12 =0.Let the representative consumer choose his holdings of
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for the individual in the foreign country.In (2) and (3), x. denotes
foreign consumption of X, y. foreign consumption of Y, p. the relative price
of X in state i in terms of X in state 0, q. the relative price of Y in state
I in terms of Y in state 0, and a bar over a variable in parentheses indicates
that this stands for an aggregate value of a variable, taken as given by the
individual in his utility-maximization. The interpretation of (2) and (3) is
easy. Consider (2). The first term on the right-hand-side shows the value of
exports of X in state i (measured in units of X in state 0) added together.
These exports are just the state-dependent payments that a person in country
one commits himself to by selling Arrow-Debreu securities. The second term
shows imports in the two states in which the home country's government does
not impose a tariff. The third term shows imports in the two states in which
there is a home tariff, and the final term shows that the tariff revenue is
refunded to people in country one. The bar indicates that the representative4
consumer takes this refund as given when he chooses his portfolio, since it
depends on the aggregate choices in the economy over which he has no control.




=x,x1 =y,y1 =x2,x2 y, and y2 x.








r3U1(x3,y3) =Xp3,T3U2(x3,y3) =Aq3(l+c). (8)
From the symmetry conditions (4), there are only three independent relative
prices, p1, p2, and p3. The equilibrium conditions
X =x.+x. (9) 1 1
yWyy (10)
(where X =+ >yW y Y) for all i, together with (4), imply that
(11)
Intuitively, in state 0 the two countries are identical in all respects except
the particular goods in which they are endowed. But the endowments have equal
value and the countries pool their goods in state 0.5
Using the first order conditions (8) and the symmetry conditions (4) and
(9) in state 3, it is seen that
U1(x,X -x.,) 1 I.) (12)
w 1+'t
U2(x3,X-x3)
determines x3.(Note that x3 is then determined from (9), and that (4)
implies y3 =x3and x3 =y.) -
Wehave only to solve for prices and equilibrium allocations in states 1
and 2. The equilibrium conditions (9) and (10), symmetry conditions (4), and








But symmetry of the utility function implies
U1(x1,XWx2) =U2(XWx2,x1)
(17)
Then, by (15), (17), and (4),
x1y2f.
(18)
According to (18), the goods not subjected to tariffs are consumed in the same







Notice that (19) implies x2 >—,and
y1 <-f—.Thedomestic country
obtains higher consumption and higher utility when state 2 occurs than when
state 1 occurs, i.e. the domestic country is better off when the foreign
country imposes a tariff.In fact, the domestic country is better off when
the foreign country imposes a tariff than with free trade.And- the domestic
country is better off with free trade than if it imposes a tariff.The
domestic country prefers state 2 (a foreign tariff) to state 0 (no tariffs) to
state 3 (tariffs in both countries) to state 1 (a domestic country tariff).
Whatever the foreign country does, the domestic country is better off without
a tariff, and whatever the domestic country does, it is better off if the
foreign country imposes a tariff.(In each case, the term "better off"
obviously refers to ex post consumption and utility, as ex ante consumption
and utility are identical across countries in our example.) The ranking of
states in this model is very different from the standard trade model or in an
uncertainty model without asset markets.







p2q1 =()(r);;. - (25)
Notice that a tariff improves the terms of trade, e.g. in state 0 the terms of
trade are unity while in state 1 the terms of trade are (2+2t)/(2+t). Despite
the improvement in the terms of trade, consumption is lower, i.e.x1 =x0but
y1 <y0.The log utility function also leads to a simple comparison of
consumption in the presence of asset trade and consumption in the standard
trade model (without asset trade). In the absence of asset markets, domestic
consumption in state 1 (with a domestic tariff) would be
.', 1+TW x1=X (26)
.-1w
yl = X




Tildas over variables have been used to denote the solution in the absence of
asset trades.Without asset trades, the domestic country clearly prefers
state 1 to state 2.Notice the relations between (26)-(27) and (21)-(23).
Consumption in state 1 in the presence of asset trade is identical to
consumption in state 2 in the absence of asset trade, and consumption in state
2 in the presence of asset trade is identical to consumption in state 1
without asset trade. So with this utility function, asset markets lead the
country to attain the same consumption when the other country imposes a tariff
as it would if it imposed a tariff in a world without asset trade. Also in
this example, the effect of a tariff on the terms of trade is smaller with8
asset markets than without them. Without asset markets, the terms of tradein
state 1 would be (2+t)/2.(This is an increase from unity in state 0.) With







Thesymmetry conditions that we have assumed in this section are not
important to the main idea, though they vastly simplify the solution. The
important point is that individuals with access to asset markets attempt to
insure against adverse states of nature. Optimal portfolios eliminate (in one
sense) variations in wealth across states of nature, though they cannot
eliminate substitution effects from variations in prices.Individuals who
have "sold" their wealth gain in a good state to "buy" wealth that offsets a
loss (the wealth effect of a fall in the terms of trade) in another state,
face only substitution effects from tariffs. Since these substitution effects
are associated with distorted prices when a home tariff is imposed,
individuals are worse off in this case.On the other hand, when the other
country imposes a tariff, there is a pure substitution effect that raises
utility.
In Figure l.a, the domestic country is shown in state 1. Figure l.b
shows the foreign country in state 1. Points A and A* show consumption levels
that would occur in state 0 (no tariffs), while points B and B show
consumptions in state 1 in the presence of complete asset markets. The dashed
line shows that the tariff has improved the domestic country's terms of trade,
but the budget lines rotate through points C and C because of optimal asset
trades. The domestic country consumes less with the domestic tariff, while
the foreign country consumes more. Consumptions in state 2 are shown as D and
D.y
Figure l.a Figure l.b
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In the log-utility example, expected utility is unaffected by the
ability to trade in asset markets.However, this conclusion does not
generalize to other utility functions or to models with production. But the
question arises as to why anyone would trade assets in the example.The
answer is that if other people trade assets and you do not, then you will have
lower expected utility. This occurs because you will obtain a positive income
effect from a domestic tariff (making you better off if state 1 occurs) but
you will receive a fall in income if there is a foreign tariff (state 2).
These income differences are of equal magnitude (at given prices), so that
concavity of your utility function guarantees you lower utility if you do not
purchase the assets than if you do.Similarly, if no one else purchases












In the previous sections it was shown that when there is a complete set
of asset markets and tariffs are the result of a political process with some
randomness attached, optimal portfolio investment radically alters the
covariation of consumption and tariffs,Instead of consuming more with a
domestic tariff that improves the terms of trade, a country consumes less in
states of the world in which it imposes a tariff, and consumes more in states
in which the other country imposes a tariff.
We now investigate the effects of changes in the size of tariffs and the
probabilities that they will be imposed. We show that, in our-example from
section II, an industry in the domestic country has an incentive to lobby for
tariff protection in the sense of a higher probability that the tariff will be
imposed or a larger tariff.
In order to make the problem tractable in the absence of symmetry
between the countries, assume that the utility functions of the representative
individuals in the domestic and foreign countries are of the HARA class, which
contain the quadratic, the constant relative risk-aversion, and constant
absolute risk-aversion utility functions as special cases, which permit
aggregation in fairly general circumstances, and which lead to simple
relations between individual allocations and economy—wide allocations that
have been called sharing rules."(See Milne (1979), Rubinstein (1974),
Grauer, Litzenberger, and Stehie (1976), and Dumas (1982)). The HARA utility
function class is the class that has
U1 - = A+Bx
U11
The utility functions that produce this result are11
1 B
U(c) .T—T(A + Bc) ,
U(c)=-Aexp(-) , B0,
U(c) ln(A+c) ,B1.
We will assume throughout that the utility functions we work with are additive
in the various goods consumed.
In each of the two countries, there is a representative individual who
consumes both goods and receives endowments of each good. Assume that all
individuals haveanidenticalHARA utility function but that the
representative person in the home country has the endowment (X,Y) while the
representative person in the foreign country has the different endowment
(X,Y). Again let X be the domestic countryts export good, assume there are
four possible states of the world that differ only insofar as tariffs are
concerned, as in the previous section.However, we drop the symmetry
assumptions made in section II, e.g. we no longer require ¶12 =
113or ¶ =t.
The representative individual in the domestic country maximizes (1)
subject to (2). The representative individual in the foreign country has an
analogous problem but with (a) a different endowment, (b) possibly a different
tariff rate, and (c) tariffs imposed in states 2 and 3 rather than 1 and 3.
Although each individual chooses eight assets (paying off two different
goods in each of four states of the world) in the model, the HARA utility
assumption can be used to solve the model by drastically reducing the
dimensions, in particular, note that relative prices in the two countries of
all state-indexed-goods are equal except when a tariff is imposed on one of
the goods. Thinking of consumption of X in state 0 as the numeraire, the
marginal rates of substitution of Y in state 0, X in state 1, and Y in state 2









where XW and are total world endowments of X and Y. The form of (30) is
all that is needed for the simplifications. The assumptions that endowments
are state-independent or that all parameters of utilities are equal across
countries could be relaxed easily.(30) and its analogues from the other
marginal rates of substitution mentioned above imply that one can define a
number (independent of the state) v such that
A+Bx0 A+By0 A+Bx1 A+By2 ____= ____ = ____ = (31)
2A+BXW2A+BYW2A+BXW2A+BYW
(31) and market-clearing conditions for these four state-indexed goods can be
used to solve for x0, y0, x0, y0, x1, x, y2, and y as functions of total
world endowments and the parameter v.
Four goods remain: Y in state 1. X in state 2, and both X and Y in state
3.The relations between the marginal rates of substitution in the two



















The market-clearing conditions can be used with these four equations to solve
for the remaining allocations. With state-independent endowments, it is
obvious that y1 =y3and x2 =x3.A little manipulation reveals that
= +1(l+t)B]l -= y3 (36)
BXW + A[l (l_t*)B
x2= 1- -B =x3 (37)
B[l +—--'(l+t*)
With these allocations known as functions of v, one can calculate price
functions (of v)directlyfrom marginal rates of substitution. When these
prices and allocations are substituted into the budget constraint, one can
solve for v as a function of endowments, the tariffs, the state-probabilities,
and the parameters of utility. visa measure of relative wealths of the two
countries.
The log-utility example of section II is obtained by setting A =0and
B =1,in which case
x0 =x1
=vXW (38)
= = vYW (39)
x2 =x3 =XW[l+-i-Y(l+1)']' (40)
y1 =y3
=yW[1÷-_(l+t)]l (41)14
Foreign consumptions can be obtained from these quantities-and the equilibrium
conditions.Substituting into the conditions equating marginal rates of





1 1 X l+t(l-v) =
q1
=— l+t (43)
iT 11 W -
2l+vn 2 X
P2 =l+tq = —- (44)
—"3l+tn —113 XW1+t(l-v)
P3 —1+tq — l+T (45)
These expressions for prices still involve the parameter v which is a measure
of the relative wealth of the domestic country as compared to the foreign
country, as is obvious from (31) and (38)-(41).v depends on relative
endowments of the two goods in each country (and in each state), as well as
probabilities of tariffs and magnitudes of tariffs.If each country has no









It is obvious from (46) that ->0and --z- <0(to see the latter, note
that v E1-vhas a form symmetric to (46)). Thus, given the probabilities of
each state of the world, the home country benefits from a higher home tariff15
and loses from a higher foreign tariff, even though, ex post, the home country
prefers the state in which it does not have a tariff and in which the foreign
country does.2 The existence of asset markets does not prevent domestic
political pressure for higher tariffs in some states of the world.
Now consider domestic political pressure to alter the probability of a
home tariff.It is obvious from (46) that an increase in offset by an
equal fall in it0,oran increase in it3offsetby an equal fall in it2,raises
v. Thus there is an incentive for the home country to lobby for tariffs in a
way that increases the probability of a tariff regardless of what the other
country does.
IV.Conclusions
Themain conclusion of the paper is that, in a world with asset markets
and political uncertainty, the observed relations between tariffs and
consumption may differ radically from thos predicted by standard trade theory
(without asset markets). In our example, domestic consumption of both imports
and exports is higher when there is a foreign tariff (and no domestic tariff)
--thanwhen there is a domestic tariff (and no foreign one). (This conclusion
was obtained despite the fact that the tariffs are small enough to improve
domestic welfare if no assets are traded.) Economists should not be surprised
if observed relations between consumption and tariffs differ from the
predictions of the standard trade theory in either time-series or cross-
sections.
In our example, a country prefers states of the world in which it does
not impose a tariff and/or the foreign country does. However, a country is
made better off by a higher probability of a domestic tariff, lower
probability of a foreign tariff, and by a higher (conditional) domestic tariff16
and lower foreign tariff. From this standpoint, the optimal policy is "talk-
loudly but carry a small stick," presuming that anyone will believe the talk.
Of course, assets are not likely to be priced in accordance with tariff
probabilities that fail to reflect actual tariff frequencies (and sizes) over
time.If imposing a tariff today leads asset markets to revise upward the
probability that tariffs will also be imposed in the future, then there is an
"investment" aspect to imposing a tariff.Part of the return from this
investment can be captured by not imposing a tariff at some future date.
We have discussed a world with complete asset markets, and it would be
useful to obtain some results when asset markets are more restricted. That
would reduce the ability of individuals to insure, though some asset trades
that cannot be made directly by individuals may be indirectly available
through multinational corporations. We have also neglected all uncertainty
except that due to the political process. Nor have we examined the intra-
country redistributions of income between factors due to tariffs when asset
trades are permitted. Finally, we have followed "standard" trade theory in
treating tariffs as exogenous. We leave for future research the incorporation
of domestic political equilibria and international trade negotiations into a
model of tariffs with uncertainty and asset markets.17
Footnotes
(1)This is a consequence of the assumption that U12 =0.If U120 then






(2)The fact that v[0,1] is used to see that y1 is increasing in t.18
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Appendixon Production
Productioncan be incorporated into the model of section II without
changing the nature of the results.Suppose the domestic economy has
production opportunities described by
F(X,Y)0 (47)
or V= f(X)with f1 and f11 negative. Similarly, let
G(,Y) =0 (48)
describe the foreign country's production opportunities, and let=
wighg1 and g11 negative.
To maintain symmetry, assume that F(X,Y) =G(Y,X)everywhere. Then f
and g are identical functions: the two countries have different production
opportunities, but each has the same opportunities for producing the other







Theadditional first-order conditions associated with production









wheref1' is the inverse function of f1.It is obvious from (50) that
X3 < so > andthe domestic country produces less of its export good
and more of its importable in state 3 than in state 0.
In state 0, (11) is still the solution for consumptions, where
production must now be indexed by state, and X0 is given in (50). Similarly,
(12) with X replacing XW gives consumption in state (3), where
X' =f1(--y—)
+ (51)
The first term in (51) comes from (50); the second term comes from (50) and
the symmetry condition Y3 =X3.If U1 =0then (13)-(16) still hold with X
replaced by X in (13) and by X in (14).Then (18) holds with X
replacing X', and (19) with X replaced by X2. These state-dependent world






-1p2 -l p1 =fi +f(f1(p2(l+t)
(53)
Then (53) and (19) imply
x2 >-, y121
Thus consumption in state 1 is y1
< whileconsumption in state 2
XW X'
is (x2 >., -—).Giventhe symmetry of the utility function, this
implies that domestic country prefers state 2 (foreign tariff) to state 1
(domestic tariff) as in the endowments model.
In the log-utility example from the previous section, we have








p2 == --- > 0
X1
We have not constructed an example with a closed-form solution for both
productions and consumptions, but suppose the production function of the
domestic country is
F(,Y) =2lnX+mY.
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sothat, for a small tariff, > > andY >Y
>Y.Thus a
domestic tariff increases domestic production of Y and reduces foreign
production of Y, with a net increase in world production of Y and a fall in
world production of X.Looking back at (54)-(56), we see that domestic
.ww
--.
consumptionin state 1 is 2+ while domestic consumption in state 2
x 1+t w 1
is (-—X2,—-—).
The utility difference between states 1 and 2 is thus
tIc,,
approximately U2 ---.Thisutility difference is thus larger the larger23
X. In particular, it is larger when resources can be moved between the two
sectors than when production is fixed at (X0,Y0). Adding production to the
model reinforces the results of section II because the tariff distorts
production in the country in which it is imposed.